Eventually the question will be asked: “Who lost Iraq?” In a way it might be seen as an improper question to ask since it presumes that Iraq was America’s to lose. The fact that it was not, however, doesn’t absolve the US of responsibility. The US has badly bungled Iraq from the beginning. The invasion was irresponsible, the occupation and administration of Iraq were disastrous, and the US departure left too many critical issues unresolved. What should also be clear is that no one is blameless.
The war was conceived in sin. It was based on the lies of the Bush administration, the most notorious of which were the fabricated projections that the war would last only a few weeks and the US presence would end in six months; it would only cost one or two billion dollars; US soldiers would be greeted as “liberators”; and Iraq’s new democracy would be “a beacon for the new Middle East”.
In October 2003, when the first Zogby poll of Iraqi opinion was released, showing that Iraqis were dissatisfied with US behaviour and wanted Americans to leave, the Bush Administration again lied. It tried to spin the poll into good news about how the US was winning.
By 2005-6, it was clear that the mess was worse than Americans imagined. The crimes at Abu Ghraib prison had shocked the world, sectarian strife had devastated Iraqi society creating waves of refugees, and both Arab and American public opinion had decided that “enough was enough”. The American debate was waged between two poles: one that called for US forces to double down, and the other which envisioned an immediate withdrawal.
It was then that Congress commissioned the Iraq Study Group (ISG) to find a way forward. When the ISG report was released, it was largely ignored. The Bush Administration ignored recommendations it didn’t like. The result was to consolidate Iraq’s sectarian divide and reinforce the country’s corrupt sect-based leadership.
Towards the end of the Bush era, the US negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa) with Iraq requiring US forces to withdraw by the end of 2011. It was this agreement that President Barack Obama was forced to implement.
During the 2008 campaign Mr Obama had rejected calls to simply abandon Iraq, insisting that the US must be “as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in”. The date for withdrawal had been set by the Sofa, and the Iraqi government insisted that it be honoured.
One of the ISG recommendations that George Bush had refused to implement was the establishment of a regional security framework. This required the participation of all the stakeholders: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria and Iran. While many of these countries might have objected, all had an interest in and a role to play in Iraq’s stability. Moreover, many of them were already involved in Iraq, in ways designed to protect their own interests. The key reason behind convening them was that it would be better to have them sitting around a table working above board than to have them manipulating events under the table. But it did not happen.
In a wide-ranging Zogby poll conducted in Iraq towards the end of 2011, the Iraqi people were deeply divided about the US presence and withdrawal. The majority Shia constituency wanted America out, but majorities among both the Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities were concerned that the US departure would put them at risk. Their biggest fears were that their country would: explode into civil war, divide along sectarian lines, and be dominated by Iran.
This was an early warning. Nevertheless, at the end of 2011, the US left Iraq in the hands of a sectarian and increasingly autocratic government. In the absence of any regional security arrangement, the Maliki government became more closely allied with Iranian interests, increasingly alienating its Sunni Arab and Kurdish constituencies.
It is just plain wrong for hawkish critics of the Obama administration to argue that “we never should have left Iraq”. They conveniently forget that they were obliged to do so by the Sofa. And it is equally wrong for doves to argue that Iraq is none of America’s business. The US has become part of Iraq’s history, and its war and occupation have created a responsibility.
That said, the US should not commit force or political capital in support of Nouri Al Maliki’s government. His sectarian policies are the reason why Iraq is imploding. The way forward is to implement the ISG report’s recommendation and convene a meeting of the regional powers to address both Iraq and Syria.
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey all have direct interests in the outcomes of the current conflicts. No one can afford further deterioration. A continuation of the fighting can only lead to greater destabilisation and greater extremism. A new order must be found that secures the rights of all citizens.
Only a regional peace arrangement can end the downwards spira.And only intense US political – and, if necessary, military – pressure can help to find a way out of this situation. President Obama should not hesitate to use force to back up a plan to convene a conference that could bring an end to Iraq and Syria’s long nightmares.
James Zogby is president of the Arab American Institute
On Twitter: @aaiusa
