Two months ago, amid heavy fighting in Damascus, rebels kidnapped 48 Iranian men who had just landed in the Syrian capital. The Iranian government and its media rushed to portray them as innocent pilgrims on their way to visit holy Shia sites, but it quickly transpired that the men might have been Revolutionary Guards on a mission. The Iranian foreign minister was later quoted as saying that some of the kidnapped men were in fact retired military personnel.
Last week, a commander of the East Ghouta Bar'a brigade holding the hostages made a disturbing announcement: it will start executing them if the Assad regime doesn't release prisoners and end its indiscriminate shelling. The Iranian government has reached out to several governments, including Qatar and Turkey, to secure the men's release, but to no avail so far.
Cooler heads among the rebels may prevail, but this episode is a chilling reminder of the reality - and perception - of Iranian involvement in Syria. Among Syrians opposed to and suffering from Assad violence, hatred of Iran is growing. Shia Iran, the reasoning goes, supports the Alawite Assads out of sheer sectarian solidarity, crystallising religious rancour.
It has a tragically comic side: a rebel unit called itself the Saddam Hussein brigade because the Iraqi dictator fought Iran. It later changed its name after realising this choice offended everyone - from the Kurds he gassed to the Kuwaitis he invaded - and apologised, but not without using prejudiced language against Shiites.
The extent of Iranian support for the Assad regime as it tries to defeat a widespread rebellion is no longer in doubt. It includes expertise in internet and communications monitoring, help to circumvent oil and other sanctions, provision of weaponry and intelligence, and counterinsurgency advice. After all, Iran has valuable know-how, having crushed its own peaceful uprising and fought insurgencies.
It also assists by keeping a cautious Turkey in check, by using a pliant Iraq as a conduit and by mobilising Hizbollah in Lebanon. The only unknown is whether Iranian troops are engaged in ground operations. This is proving difficult to confirm, even as alleged sightings increase.
Tehran has valuable interests at stake: its force-multiplying alliance with Damascus has withstood the vagaries of Middle East politics and endless Arab and western attempts to pull them apart. The alliance has long - and mistakenly - been portrayed as one of convenience: the two countries were too dissimilar, many luminaries thought.
In fact, the alliance resembles an arranged marriage that turned out much better than either of the two parties expected. Tough security-minded men, who operated for 30 years in the shadows and became brothers in arms, forged it. Although not always in sync, the two countries shared animosity towards the US and the Gulf states, gave each other strategic depth, and nurtured Hizbollah, which grew into the third leg of this mighty alliance.
Its durability, however, made Iran complacent and blind. Not surprisingly for a regime that engages in repression at home and doesn't care about human rights abroad, it badly misread Syrian dynamics, misjudging the strength of the Assad regime and the anger against it. Iran, it turns out, didn't know nor care about Syrian society.
Iran's involvement in Syria serves several overlapping goals: to contribute to the regime's survival strategy; to secure supply lines to Hizbollah; to prepare for the eventual day after; and to strengthen its negotiating hand in case of a (still unlikely) regional arrangement. Much has been made of its quartet with Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to find a regional solution to the crisis. This was never going to go anywhere, but helped Iran to appear constructive and engaged. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made sure there was no ambiguity about Iran's commitment: "Iran will defend Syria because it supports its policy of resistance against the Zionist regime, and is strongly opposed to any interference by foreign forces in Syria's internal affairs."
In truth, the loss of Syria would amount to a huge, albeit not debilitating, setback to Iran. If plan A is for the Assads to survive, plan B is to make the most out of Syria's civil war. Iran has the experience, expertise and strategic patience needed to thrive in countries undergoing civil strife. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, Iran proved competent and opportunistic. It cultivated allies and proxies, including unlikely ones (such as Taliban factions in Afghanistan), and smartly calibrated its operations and behaviour.
Compared to its rivals in the Gulf, which also intervened in the same theatres, Iran can at least show results. Syria should be no different: as its civil war unfolds, there will be groups needing sponsorship, whether remnants of the Assad regime or others.
But Iran can only lose influence in Syria because things were so good for it until recently. The questions are how much, and what is the cost of limiting the damage. This is not lost on everyone in Tehran. Some strategists must be wondering whether three decades of investments of money, political capital and security cooperation were worth it when its Syrian ally proves so frail and its Palestinian partner Hamas so unreliable. Judging by the slogan heard this month in the streets of Tehran - "Leave Syria alone, think about us" - ordinary Iranian citizens are not too happy.
But would it be possible to reorient its foreign and security policy? Iran is unlikely to abandon its Mediterranean reach. As is plainly clear, the regional balance will not change in the Gulf, but in the Levant. Iran needs a well-equipped Hizbollah to deter and punish Israel.
Its Levantine presence serves two other important purposes: to convince Arabs and Sunnis that Iran stands for them (surely a losing proposition now) and to cater to the small but powerful ideological factions at home. Turning its back on the Levant to focus on its immediate neighbourhood (namely, the Gulf) would make Iran look even more sectarian and imperialistic.
Having invested so much in Syria, Iran will find it hard to write the country off as a sunk cost, to everyone's detriment.
Emile Hokayem is the senior fellow for Middle East security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the former political editor of The National
On Twitter: @Emile_Hokayem
