Political life - peaceful, public debate and compromise about what's best for the country - is breaking out in Egypt.
The immediate result, as The National reported yesterday, is difficulties for the Salafist party, Al Nour. Salafist views on how to run a state do not accord with political pluralism and the compromises that are at the heart of democratic politics.
Remember that Al Nour, though established in 2001, was illegal until June 2011. Its strong showing in last year's parliamentary elections - giving it about a quarter of the seats - surprised many. But now that potent bloc is on the point of splitting. An internal dispute over choosing regional party officers is one problem, but a bigger one is how closely the party should work with the Muslim Brotherhood administration.
The Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), bigger and more sophisticated, is already playing the political game well. Mohammed Morsi's election to the presidency as the FJP candidate alarmed many among Egypt's liberals and religious minorities, but so far he has devoted himself largely to issues and approaches that are far from doctrinaire Islamism.
He has obviously found a way to get along with the military, which still wields enormous economic power. His skill in starting to reclaim Egypt's lost position on the regional and world stage has the support of many Egyptians. He had no room for Salafists in his cabinet, but has promised to name a Christian and a woman to senior posts. He also appointed Al Nour's president, Emad Abdel-Ghafour, as an adviser, which seems to be deepening the split in the Salafist party.
At the moment Egypt's political class is less motivated by electoral politics than by the country's constitution. In the 100-member committee now drafting that document, for instance, the two Islamists blocs are co-operating smoothly, using their majority to write in pre-eminence for Sharia, and limits on political expression. What comes out of the committee, and how the draft constitution fares in the referendum on it expected next year, will determine how much democracy Egyptians will have.
Beyond all this political science, however, the real problems of most Egyptians - economic stagnation and inefficiency, the concentration of wealth, inadequate infrastructure and public health - are as grave now as they were before the 2011 revolution. Will the country's new political system encourage its leaders to tackle those problems? That's possible, but is far from being assured.
