It is now six years since a group of schoolchildren inspired by the revolts under way in Tunisia and Egypt daubed “the people want the regime to fall” on walls in the southern Syrian city of Deraa. Their action was repressed with all the ferocity that the regime of president Bashar Al Assad is known for, sparking a revolt that turned into a war of survival for the regime, which lasts to this day.
It is said that the hours of video uploaded to YouTube and other sites exceed the total hours of the war itself. With all those images spinning through our heads, there is no need to recap what has happened. But it might be useful to pick a few predictions which did not come to pass.
First, president Assad did not quit, as he was enjoined to by the Obama White House. Second, Mr Obama did not enforce his “red line” against chemical weapons, proving – as he later acknowledged – that he had no intention of getting directly involved in another war in the Middle East.
Third, the colonial-era borders of the region did not melt away, despite the efforts of ISIL to show it had created a “caliphate” on the ruins of Iraq and Syria. As the war has dragged on, borders are now being reinforced, particularly by Turkey. The twin assaults on ISIL in Mosul and its capital of Raqqa, in Syria, are separate theatres of war, though the Americans are taking lessons learnt from Mosul to the coming battle.
Nor has Syria been divided up into ethnic or sectarian cantons – there is no “state of the Alawites” as existed under French rule, or any “Druzistan”. The real division of the country is between the “useful Syria” – largely in regime hands – and the less populated regions of the east, for the moment controlled by the rebels.
Some things happened that took the world by surprise. Russia proved itself a master of timing by intervening to turn the tide of battle in the regime’s favour, leading to the re-capture of Aleppo.
The Kurds, who originally appeared marginal to the fortunes of the war, are now major players, courted or attacked by the outside powers.
Turkey, which seemed at the start of the war to be strong and stable enough to impose its will on Syria, suffered devastating blowback from its hubris. And finally Al Qaeda, which seemed in 2011 to be reduced to bunch of criminals and psychopaths following the ageing and ill-tempered Ayman Al Zawahiri, looks likely to be reborn as the backbone of the remaining rebel forces.
All this goes to show that predictions of the outcome of war should be taken with a pinch of salt. One thing is clear: the advantage is with the regime, thanks to the actions of its allies and other outside parties.
Despite the horrendous crimes committed by the regime – including the targeting of hospitals and the torture and execution of doctors who treated people on the rebel side – this looks to be the narrative of the next stage.
The peace process, such as it is, is under increasing Russian influence. The Trump administration is focusing its efforts on destroying ISIL. It has sent 400 more United States marines to assist in the expected assault on Raqqa, doubling the US presence on the ground.
The Americans have chosen as the strike force the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, seen by the Pentagon as the most reliable allies.
This view is not shared by Turkey, which sees them as terrorists, due to their affiliation with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a revolutionary socialist outfit that launched an armed struggle on the Turkish state in 1984.
As the Turkish army is present on Syrian soil along with its own affiliated rebel factions, it is not overly dramatic to predict a shooting war between the Turkish allied forces and the Kurds. For the regime, however, having the uninvited guests coming to blows is not a bad thing.
And who will take control of the city once it falls? The Kurds are as foreign to the people of Raqqa as the US army rangers and Marines who are helping them. What passes for the Syrian army will no doubt be called on to take control.
By rights the Kurds should expect a reward, but they have been double-crossed in the past and may be again. US support may melt away when Raqqa falls, and the Turks may destroy the self-government they have established in northern Syria. All these outcomes would be a bonus for the regime.
In the other areas outside regime control, a radical realignment of the remnants of the rebels is taking place. The Al Qaeda affiliate that used to be known as the Nusra Front has now folded itself into innocuous sounding Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, the committee for the liberation of Syria. This rebranding exercise is designed to put clear water between it and the head-choppers of ISIL so that the Al Qaeda stalwarts can present themselves as natural leaders of the rebels.
It has always been the goal of the Assad family to present its opponents as Islamist fanatics, even when they were ordinary folk protecting themselves from the depredations of the Syrian security services. Now, thanks to the vacillation of the rebels’ allies and their failure to provide the weaponry that could have turned the war in their favour, the regime’s propaganda is moving ever closer to fact.
That does not mean victory for the Assad family. It is exhausted and its ragged army relies on foreign mercenaries. Syria will continue to be a battleground, but one where the foreign players are dominant, and the voice of the Syrians is hardly heard. It is difficult to see how the regime can rebuild the country.
With hindsight, it should have been clear that the regime and its backers would fight to the death to stay in power, as they have done.
Alan Philps is a commentator on global affairs
On Twitter: @aphilps
