Rumours swirl around Pakistan’s role in antiterror Islamic Alliance

There are practical issues to be addressed in the formation of the global Islamic Alliance, writes Shaukat Qadir

Militants from ISIL pose after seizing an Iraqi army checkpoint. The Islamic Alliance will target groups beyond ISIL. (AFP PHOTO / HO / WELAYAT SALAHUDDIN)
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Since last month’s visit by the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif and the army chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, to Saudi Arabia, rumours have been afloat in Pakistan that King Salman has offered Gen Raheel the command of all forces under the Saudi-led Islamic Alliance.

Last December, the Saudi defence minister, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who seems to be leading a more vigorous foreign policy, announced the creation of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism. Its primary objective was “to protect the Muslim countries from all terrorist groups and terrorist organisations irrespective of their sect and name”.

It was announced that the coalition would work to target any terrorist organisation, not just ISIL, operating in countries including Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s inclusion has been a matter of controversy domestically. Apparently, the Pakistan government was initially unaware that it had been included in the alliance.

Despite some hue and cry from the opposition, the idea seems to have been accepted. The strong rumour that Gen Sharif has been offered the assignment of leading the military alliance has also been received with mixed feelings.

Many feel that it’s an honour and a recognition that Pakistan has a military force that is successfully combating terrorism. Others are opposed to it.

They hold the view that the Saudis are using it to ensure that Pakistan’s military makes a meaningful contribution to the alliance. They also feel that this inclusion forces Pakistan into an alliance that it should avoid for reasons including the apparent dearth of Shias in the force.

A number of Muslim-majority countries have not been invited – including Syria, Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, Benin, Gabon and Togo are not Muslim-majority countries, but are members of the alliance.

My concern is a conceptual one. Practical difficulties may be addressed after the concept is clear. How is it supposed to work? It is not clear whether the alliance will have a standing military or follow the United Nations model and draw forces from member states when required.

The UN began its peacekeeping operations very humbly. Over decades it has reached the stage where it now has a permanent military adviser for peacekeeping operations. Perhaps the Islamic Alliance will have a similar structure.

While the UN force has sometimes violated and, on exceptional occasions, overstepped its assigned role, it claims to be bound by the principle of “acceptance” – that, at the very least, the states involved in hostilities want UN intervention.

One might assume that the same would apply to the anti-terrorist operations that member states of the alliance might undertake.

On the same assumption, funding for these operations would come from contributions by member states. And here is where we begin to hit snags.

The UN is essentially based on an elitist concept, where some states are more equal than others and exercise the right to veto. A measure of balance is provided by the fact that, among the states that can veto, not all are on the same page.

Will members of the Islamic Alliance be similarly organised? If so, who will have the right of veto and on what basis?

In the UN, the United States is the largest contributor in terms of funds. (It is also the largest defaulter.) This makes it capable of exerting an inordinate influence over the UN decision-making process. Some member states feel that the UN has, over time, become an extension of US policy.

Will the Islamic Alliance take a similar direction?

Much remains unknown about how it will operate. Will only member countries be able to seek assistance in counter terrorist operations? If neighbouring countries are excluded, will this limit the alliance’s effectiveness or jeopardise its operations?

Whether it is headed by Gen Sharif or an officer from elsewhere, these and other issues – both conceptual and practical – will have to be addressed.

Brig Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer