From the Iraqi government’s perspective, the current situation seems particularly precarious: Fallujah has been an opposition stronghold for months now and is only 40 kilometres from Baghdad airport. Meanwhile, Baquba and Samarra – where clashes between Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish forces have been continuing for days – may both be about to tumble out of control.
An earlier position taken by the US government to only provide direct military assistance in the event of Nouri Al Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, making real political change, has moderated significantly in recent days.
And a recent announcement by Barack Obama to deploy 300 US military advisers in Iraq to assist the Iraqi forces could, if carried out, further destabilise the region.
Firstly, the key issue at stake – that of Sunni estrangement and oppression by the central government – has not been resolved. This issue appears to be at the very heart of the grievances felt by the Sunnis, one that groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have seized upon and are leveraging.
While these groups number only a few thousand insurgents and would be incapable of holding large swathes of territory for long periods, the significant overlap in interests between these organisations and local populations makes this possible, at least in the short-term.
Estranged from government administrators, commanders and the mainstream, the residents of these areas have chosen to at least temporarily tolerate the advances of the insurgents.
But any US intervention brings with it several risks that could quickly make a bad situation much worse.
The fact that America has not completely abandoned Mr Al Maliki has emboldened him to believe that not only can he survive this current crisis but that he will be able to beat back the advancing insurgents and even emerge stronger for it.
Aided, by foreign advisers and intelligence support, there will almost certainly be an attempt to recapture territory held by insurgents, up the Tikrit-Baji-Mosul line in the north as well as the Fallujah-Ramadi axis in the west.
This “Maliki Reconquista” will involve large numbers of Shiite Iraqi troops, who in addition to being poorly trained and led, might possibly be out for vengeance.
This military scenario will rely on heavy firepower to clear out areas with suspected insurgents. Such an offensive would be akin to the campaign being waged by the Assad regime in Syria’s major cities and towns – and would likely bring with it far-reaching consequences.
Civilian casualties would almost certainly be high in such a scenario. The potential for backlash will be very significant.
The inadequacy of the Iraqi Security Forces in handling the most recent challenges may force the US military to significantly expand their mission in Iraq.
Despite Obama’s promises, an administration that cannot even keep its word on whether it will send help to the Maliki administration or not cannot be relied on to not let the mission creep.
What this will mean is that Iraq could once again be overcome by a long drawn-out sectarian conflict, attracting support and financing for the cause of jihadists across the world.
Images of Sunni civilians dying in such a conflict would galvanise many more individuals into supporting the jihadi cause. This, in turn, would have severe repercussions for regional stability.
Oil prices could fluctuate wildly in response to such a conflict – some analysts are already speculating that the price will top $140 a barrel if the Iraq crisis continues and its production drops – and that will have inevitable economic repercussions around the world.
As the jihadis gather more resources and supporters, their international network could also potentially expand greatly. The impact on international terrorism of the 2003 invasion of Iraq was significant.
The only hope in averting the escalation of this conflict is not in US intervention, but a political settlement that resolves the political grievances that the Sunni population has accumulated. Otherwise, Iraq will continue its slide into fragmentation.
Ahmed Al Attar is a defence and security commentator based in Abu Dhabi
On Twitter: @AhmedwAlAttar
