India’s change in government coincides with broader changes across the region. Islamabad recently formed a new administration, while Kabul is set to usher in a new dispensation. Both capitals hold significant security and foreign policy imperatives for New Delhi. It is, however, in Afghanistan where the shifting regional dynamics will critically play out, with the quest for greater influence between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan exacerbating existing regional fault lines while creating new fissures.
For India, the immediate challenge lies in Kashmir. Even before the new government could assume office in New Delhi, the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir witnessed turmoil. Last year saw a steep rise in militancy related incidents in Kashmir with the LoC being violated 200 times. This year forecasts a continuation of the trend.
The recently concluded Lok Sabha elections witnessed a surge in violence – a phenomenon anticipated to intensify during the state legislature elections later this year. These elections provide militants with the opportunity to undermine Indian institutions, while creating space for their own radical agenda.
The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its receding focus on the region will provide further leeway for radicalised violence to expand its tentacles. Having been able to “drive out” foreign forces from Afghanistan, radical elements will want to replicate the model elsewhere. In this scenario, Kashmir provides the ideological impetus in the backdrop of missed opportunities for its resolution while being a prestigious prize within the Pakistan based militant hierarchy.
The contest for a greater foothold in Afghanistan between India and Pakistan further confounds the tangle.
For Pakistan, its fragile relationship with Afghanistan over the Durand Line, its internal challenges from domestic militancy exacerbated by a porous border with Afghanistan, the threat of a resurgent Iran in the backdrop of the Middle Eastern sectarian divide and the perceptions of being “encircled” by India, intensify its need for a policy of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is also emerging as an essential element of India’s security construct, especially in key areas of energy security and trade. With an energy shortage forecast for 2030, India eyes the Middle East and Central Asia to meet its energy requirements especially as its dependence on imported oil reflects a steep rise.
In addition, it needs to create diversified avenues of trade. India will have to generate 10 million jobs each year against the backdrop of a slowing economy. Such circumstances provide potential catchment for recruitment of radicals – identified by former prime minister Manmohan Singh as India’s foremost internal security challenge. Within all this, Afghanistan sits on the cusp of greater trade and energy access for India to the Middle East, Central Asia, Turkey and beyond.
The resultant contest for spheres of influence in Afghanistan could spill into Kashmir. This could further sharpen the volatile security scenario of the region.
Alternatively, a more collaborative engagement in Afghanistan could prove the panacea, not just for the immediate challenges but for long-term regional stability and prosperity.
For starters, Pakistan could extend a “non-discriminatory market access” agreement to India. A liberalising economic engagement could eventually be linked to the Afghanistan Trade Transit Agreement (ATTA) between Pakistan and Afghanistan, providing India access to Afghanistan. The resultant trade could in turn be integrated with the Silk Route Initiative (SRI) undertaken by Afghanistan to revive ancient trade ties with Central Asia. The envisaged Gwadar-Kashgar trade route could also eventually be roped into the expanding trade grid. Not only would this provide India access to a diverse trade corridor but it would also rejuvenate Pakistan’s ailing economy.
The two country’s energy deficits could also be met by the potential pipeline projects rooted in the region. At present, the confrontational environment of the region makes even the completion of the relatively short and cheap TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) pipeline improbable by its set deadline of 2017.
One of the most important collaborations could be harnessing the water resources of the region. Concerted efforts by India and Pakistan to upgrade Afghanistan’s dilapidated irrigation system allowing it to reduce wastage could lead to a water-sharing arrangement between Pakistan and Afghanistan – a prospect the World Bank has looked into. Not only could this lessen the friction over the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) but also diversify Pakistan’s water resources reducing its dependence on the rivers flowing from Kashmir.
At present, Kashmir lies at the heart of Pakistan’s water security. By diversifying Pakistan’s water resources it will lessen the country’s focus on Kashmir, and allow the possibility of a more flexible and creative approach to the issue by all stakeholders.
The recent meeting in New Delhi between Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif, his counterpart, was a proactive step towards normalisation. However, their talks must move into more constructive territory.
Mr Modi may just have the credentials to strike the right equilibrium between his right-wing background and pragmatic trade-oriented policies. One way would be to reach out to and strengthen the civil set-up in Pakistan as was done by sending the invite in the first place. Equally courageous was the acceptance of the invitation on the part of Mr Sharif and traversing the distance. Now they must insulate the process against those who choose to spoil it.
Asma-Khan Lone writes for a number of newspapers in India and Pakistan
