Three years ago, Egypt was on the cusp of revolution. As the anniversary of the January 25 uprising draws near, it is time for those who supported the revolution to realise that they have failed to bring about sufficient change. Whether they decide now that their work is over is a choice they must make for themselves.
Before the uprising, a loose network of political activists, progressive journalists and civil rights campaigners stimulated a movement that later attracted a broad and representative cross-section segments of society.
The end result was 18 days of protests that brought together Islamists, leftists, Christians, secular Muslims, men and women. They upheld the slogans of the revolution: bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity.
After Hosni Mubarak’s removal, that movement needed to shift from protest to political organisation. The lack of a cohesive leadership meant that on the political level the revolution could be easily manipulated, exploited and swayed. But mobilisation was still vital and did not need to be abandoned as a tactic.
Some revolutionaries did move into the political arena. But they still failed to produce a viable political alternative for the people of Egypt. Most revolutionaries rejected the road map of the military in March 2011 but the plan went ahead. In the first parliamentary election after the January 25 uprising, a majority of Egyptians decided to give non-revolutionary Islamist parties a chance. In the presidential election after that, the revolutionary vote was split, and the resulting disarray led to a showdown between a partisan Islamist movement and a representative of the former regime.
Mohammed Morsi’s election did not stop revolutionaries from engaging in politics. But they still failed to establish a cohesive bloc that could make a difference. This was clear in the run-up to the constitutional referendum, and the failure to get more than 10 per cent of the voting population to vote against the constitution.
Nevertheless, as Mr Morsi was constantly embroiled with battles against institutions of the state, his was a weak presidency. In that environment, revolutionaries had space to operate, as the two powerful poles of political gravity collided with each other.
In 2011, the military removal of Mr Mubarak and the ensuing road map provided for a considerable amount of space for political diversity. Remnants of the former regime did not engage in open confrontation against the new political order. While some arrests and trials took place, the resulting political polarisation was not overwhelmingly tense. The removal of Mr Morsi, in contrast, resulted in arrests and political opposition from the pro-Morsi camp. Under the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and Mr Morsi, the revolution had the option of engaging in formal political life. The revolution relegated itself to the margins of Egyptian political life. The dominant forces in Egyptian politics now seem keen to keep it there. This will be the case for the foreseeable future.
Those who support the values of the revolution still have a chance. Tactics such as street protests have been treated as substitutes for political organisations. These are not sufficient, and never have been. Mobilisations such as protests are useful when organisations or parties for political platforms can capitalise on them. If there is no such organisation, the mobilisation runs the risk of petering out, or being exploited by other parties.
As the “maverick middle” in Egyptian society, the revolution has not had critical mass since February 2011. Almost three years on, revolutionaries have to recognise their failings and refocus their activities. They should focus on civil society and grassroots change. They are not the only activities but they must be the primary ones. Media outlets, civil rights organisations and other forms of civil society activism must be strengthened.
Moreover, they must work with each other. Abuses by the state, as well as political forces in support of, and against, the state, will continue. All abuses must be highlighted, without distinction or partisanship. It seems that those who considered themselves revolutionaries on January 25, 2011, will be the only ones willing to do that thankless job.
The revolution remains relevant, but Egypt has paid a high price for the failure of its supporters. There may be a day when these people can stimulate the creation of a cohesive political alternative, but that day is not here.
The revolution has been shunted to the margins and that is where it will stay until those who believed in it learn the lessons of the last three years. The work of the revolutionaries is not over, but it is certainly more complicated.
Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC
On Twitter: @hahellyer
