As South Sudan’s warring sides move closer to a ceasefire agreement to stop hostilities in a conflict that has killed thousands, displaced almost half a million, and continues to edge the country towards civil war, two primary narratives are emerging. First, the political and security dynamics of the region are being reshaped in ways that will have ramifications for years to come. And, second, the process of transforming a newly independent state into a robust democracy is revealed as a superficial exercise, in which the political leadership, regional economic interests and the wider international community are all complicit.
While the fighting that broke out in mid-December was sparked by a political power struggle between president Salva Kiir and his former vice-president, Riek Machar, it quickly escalated into a national emergency. Along with the political rift, the national military leadership also divided as commanders aligned themselves with one side or the other. It has also taken on an ethnic dimension, the leaders using tribal allegiances to mobilise support, and with Uganda’s forces assisting Mr Kiir, it has quickly become a regional issue.
This conflict, however, has been brewing for some time, and is the result of festering wounds that the transition to statehood has failed to heal. Understanding this is not only critical for finalizing a ceasefire, but will be necessary in trying to create a political atmosphere that promotes peace.
When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between southern Sudan and Khartoum in 2005, ending over two decades of civil war, a sense of hope spread across the southern region. This was taken a step further in 2011, when southerners overwhelmingly voted to separate from Sudan.
Because the world badly wanted this new country to thrive, the money and aid poured in. Technicians arrived and set about making a country; they built roads and infrastructure, propped up civil society and services, offered skills and training to young government institutions. Regional neighbors and businesses invested as well, capitalising on this development gold rush, particularly in regards to resources such as oil.
This rapid exercise in state building hid the real challenge facing the country: the deep divisions between a hopeful and thriving people ready to move on from decades of the war, and the political elites who drew their approach to governance from the centralised and authoritarian approach they learnt in the army.
Even during the civil war, southerners were not united in their ideologies and aspirations. In the 1990s, for example, fissures in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – the rebel party that signed the peace agreement with Khartoum and now headed by Mr Kiir – led to serious infighting as the movement leadership vied for power. As with the current fighting, the leaders mobilised support through ethnic allegiances, leading to widespread civilian casualties and humanitarian disaster.
At independence and in the years since, a full attempt to integrate various political perspectives, ethnic allegiances, and militia factions was never made. Instead, a fragile semblance of unity was created by placing different political elites in top posts and drawing various militias into the national army without fully integrating them. Because the SPLM stands dominant in the current political atmosphere of South Sudan, the one who heads the party will most likely take the presidential seat in the 2015 elections. So, when there is party disagreement like that which sparked the fighting last month, the leadership forgoes the democratic process and turns to the only thing they know: violence and a military solution.
The negotiations in Addis Ababa over the last couple weeks have focused on immediately stopping the fighting. Under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—an East African regional group that helped negotiate an end to the north-south civil war—supported by the AU, UN, and international partners, the warring sides are being encouraged to end hostilities. As was the case with Darfur, this is another test of African-centred efforts to resolve conflict on the continent, and even if a ceasefire is agreed to it will just be the first step in a larger task of promoting a political culture of peace rather than violence.
This will require continued direct engagement by regional and international partners, a reality that is further complicated by the Uganda’s military involvement on the side of president Mr Kiir. Not only does this create a feeling of isolationism among Mr Machar and his factions, leading to more radical approaches that will make it harder to find a way forward, but it also raises questions about the neutrality of the IGAD mediators, of which Uganda is a member. Strong regional cooperation will be critical in resolving this conflict and helping South Sudan move forward, but this wedge by Uganda, the displacement of civilians into neighboring states, and the concentration of the fighting in the oil-rich border regions—which is likely to affect Sudan’s own internal conflicts – has the potential to mire the region for years to come.
In sum, there will be no military solution to this conflict. If the fighting does continue and a distinct winner emerges on the battlefield, it will simply recreate a political atmosphere of authoritarianism and military-centred politics. Ethnic animosity will spread and become further ingrained, positioning South Sudan for more violence during the next political disagreement.
If, on the other hand, a ceasefire is agreed to, then South Sudan will have to find a way to use this situation as an opportunity to reshape the political atmosphere in the country. The scars are deep and will take a long time to heal, but the energy and sense of hope that filled the country post-independence still burns and can find a way. The sad truth, however, is that the national leaders appear capable of destroying all that has been worked for. Either they will have to put their military pasts behind them and learn a new way to govern, or they may have to step aside.
Brendan Buzzard is a freelance writer and Africa analyst based in Kenya
