It is good that Europe's political leaders think they have completed this year's attempt at saving the euro and can hit the sun-loungers happy, but what has gone on in Brussels is more euro-fudge.
The problem dates back to its very inception. At the time it was set up, many economists noted that there could not be monetary union without political union. Not all economists agree, but then economists never do.
Why is this so important? Because to shackle a disparate bunch of economies together is not a simple task. Policymakers' main tools, interest rates and fiscal levers, cannot be equally applied at the same time.
A low interest rate that might suit Germany would not necessarily suit Spain, Ireland or Greece.
And so it proved. Before Greece joined the euro club, its economy was shaky, but it discovered it could borrow extensively - and cheaply. Now it is saddled with debts it cannot repay, mainly because it does not raise enough from taxes.
In the old days of the drachma, it could have devalued the currency, which would at least have reduced its debt burden. It cannot do that. It is like the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen, whose boat Fram was locked in the Arctic ice, unable to go either backwards or forwards for three years.
The economists and the politicians hoped that monetary union would lead to political union. But nobody could work out how Europe could be ruled democratically by a central government, so nobody bothered. The problem with debt is that it does not go away.
If you avoid it and try to pretend that it doesn't exist, as Japan did in the 1990s, it just grows and grows. The only way to tackle it is to sit down with the creditors and force them to agree on a solution that allows you to repay less than you borrowed.
Ten years ago, a foolish experiment to peg the Argentine peso to the US dollar failed. The Argentine government defaulted on its debt of about US$93 billion (Dh341.58bn). American bankers had at least learnt one lesson, and rather than giving Argentina syndicated loans, they instead arranged bond issues for the country, which meant they were spared the pain themselves.
Bondholders eventually agreed to write off much of the principal and to grant longer repayment terms. The peso floated freely against the dollar, moving from parity to three to one.
I visited Buenos Aires soon afterwards, and it was a pleasant place to shop. To a much lesser extent, Dubai has benefited from the restructuring of US$24.9bn of debt owed by Dubai World.
Nobody should be under any illusion this weekend. The euro in its present guise is doomed, and will continue to bring pain and penury to the periphery.
It will take many years to make it vanish.
