Tony Hayward was honourable – and largely right

At a meeting of oil industry experts in Dubai this week, Tony Hayward got the conversation flowing.

Tony Hayward prepares to testify in Washington.
Powered by automated translation

At a convivial meeting of oil industry experts in Dubai this week, one topic got the post-lunch conversation flowing: the fate, and the faults, of Tony Hayward, BP's former chief executive.

Mr Hayward, it will be recalled, quit the top job at the oil giant, after the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon well in April had caused what was widely described as the "worst environmental disaster in US history".

For many of the lunchers, for whom the summer holidays and Ramadan had interrupted their normal pattern of business, it was the first occasion they had had to discuss BP and Mr Hayward since his exit; certainly the first since the formal handover of power to his successor, Bob Dudley, at the start of this month.

The consensus was this: Mr Hayward had been a "fall guy" in a highly political game played out between President Barack Obama, the US oil industry, and the global media; he had made some mistakes, but these were largely errors of presentation, rather than of substance; and his version of events had subsequently been largely proved correct.

On many of the central arguments of this revisionist school, you have to agree: Mr Hayward was as much a victim as a perpetrator, and ultimately rather an honourable man. The reaction from the American political establishment to the disaster that unfolded from April onwards was hysterical. Egged on by the president himself, who wanted to know "whose ass to kick" over the affair, US politicians outbid each other to find words strong enough to condemn Mr Hayward.

Preliminary reports from the US national oil spill commission this week suggest this was partly a cover-up operation to mask the administration's own inadequate response to the events of April. When Mr Hayward appeared before a congressional committee in June, it was like a scene from The Godfather movie, in which the pure-white defenders of the public conscience finally get the chance to confront the evil gang boss. The opportunity for the damning sound bite was too much for the politicians to ignore.

The US oil industry saw an opportunity to kick a rival, and a foreign one at that. Companies that have been guilty of corruption and environmental damage on virtually every continent were outraged at the behaviour of BP and its boss.

Some were, of course, acutely aware that they had been part of the Gulf of Mexico disaster themselves, as partners with BP in the Deepwater rig, and stood to lose big-time from any litigation that would result. Others were just happy to see the BP share price collapse to a level where they might bid for the distressed British company, or buy parts of it in a fire-sale of assets.

The US media, and liberal commentators everywhere, leapt on the story. As one insider at BP headquarters in London puts it: "There's nothing the media likes better than a rolling story of disaster unfolding on a daily basis where a multinational corporation can be placed at the centre of blame." Mr Hayward, it must be admitted, did himself no favours. When he was spotted taking some time off on a yacht, and when he told reporters "I'd like my life back", it played very badly indeed. A prickly British executive with an apparent chip on his shoulder was not the best frontman for such a crisis situation. But behind the problems with his persona, what did Mr Hayward say that was incorrect?

From very early on in the disaster, he stuck to two themes: that the spill was a regrettable event, but one that could be contained and repaired; and that BP would pay full compensation to those whose livelihoods had been affected, and for the full cost of the clean-up. On the first point, it seems that he was right.

Those fear-mongers who imagined the Gulf of Mexico as a toxic lake of oil that might flow into the Atlantic and even reach Europe were just plain wrong. A report by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in August said that 75 per cent of the oil that had spilled into the Gulf was no longer detectable; it had been captured, dispersed or had evaporated. Large expanses of ocean thought to be long-term no-go areas for humans and animal life were declared open for business.

Mr Hayward had said that, compared with the vastness of the ocean into which the oil was leaking, the spill was relatively small and manageable. Unlike the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska in 1989, where heavy oil leaked into very cold water, the combination of light oil in the Gulf's warm waters had not amounted to environmental Armageddon. Again, it looks as though he was right.

And BP has certainly paid for its mistakes. It has set aside US$20 billion (Dh73.45bn) as a compensation fund, and has already paid $11.2bn for the well-capping, clean-up and initial compensation claims. Mr Hayward, of course, paid with his job.

Some of the oilmen in Dubai this week thought Mr Hayward should have hung on and weathered the storm, but most believed he took the correct decision in quitting. The environmental damage and the cost to BP happened on his watch, and he did the honourable thing.

When the revisionist process is complete, Mr Hayward may even be regarded as a role model: one of the few senior executives of a multinational corporation to have had the decency to take the blame, apologise, and quit. Rare indeed.