Nuclear overreaction

• Last Updated: November 21. 2008 9:30AM UAE / November 21. 2008 5:30AM GMT

Eyes on the prize: Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Hassan Firouzabadi, the head of the armed forces, watch a missile test-firing in 2004. AFP

The bomb will not make Iran the Gulf’s dominant power, F Gregory Gause writes. But can the Iranians be convinced?


With Barack Obama publicly committed to a new round of outreach toward Tehran, it seems inevitable that high-level dialogue between the United States and Iran will resume in 2009. Obama will need to engage with Iran as he seeks to draw down American forces in Iraq. On the Iranian side, a precipitous fall in oil prices has left the regime rather less confident, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is facing what could be a difficult re-election campaign in June, may seek to disarm his more liberal critics by pursuing direct talks with the United States. His letter of congratulation to Obama – which was remarkably civil and direct for Ahmadinejad – should be seen as a signal in that direction. If Ahmadinejad loses, his successor, whoever that may be, will likely be much more disposed toward an opening to Washington.

The most pressing issue on the agenda will be the Iranian nuclear programme; Obama has recently reiterated the position he stated during the campaign, that a nuclear-armed Iran is “unacceptable”. But no Iranian leader – even one less belligerent than Ahmadinejad (or Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) – is going to dismantle the nuclear programme in response to American pressure. The US – and Iran’s Gulf neighbours – will need to supply those Iranians who are prepared to compromise with arguments and incentives to face down the hardliners in Iran’s internal debates. And the best argument, paradoxically, may be that a nuclear Iran will not radically alter the political dynamics of the Gulf region.

Given that acquiring nuclear weapons will be costly for Iran (in terms of international sanctions and further isolation) and dangerous (since it will invite a possible Israeli or American attack), the best case against developing nuclear capability is that the benefits will hardly match the costs.

Making that case to the Iranians involves two steps. The first is for President Obama to make clear to Tehran that he does not seek regime change. This will be an easier task for Obama than it was for George Bush, who had often stated his preference for an end to the regime of the ruling clerics. The beginning of American troop withdrawals from Iraq will be tangible evidence that Obama does not intend to use Iraq as a base to pressure Iran or encourage domestic opposition to the clerical regime. To the extent that Iran’s nuclear programme is intended to deter American interference, a clear indication from the new administration that regime change is off the table, followed by the start of the troop drawdown in Iraq, could convince some among the Iranian elite that nuclear “protection” is unnecessary.

The second step will be more difficult: it must be made clear to the Iranians that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will not lead to Iranian dominance in the Gulf. But first the US and the Gulf states must convince themselves this is true. At present, both the US and the Arab states are committed to arguing the opposite – that a nuclear Iran will wield increased power in the region – and this argument has been the central plank in their position that Iran must not be allowed to obtain the bomb. But talk of a new era of Iranian dominance only makes the nuclear option more attractive to Iran’s leaders. Who wouldn’t want to be the dominant regional power? If nuclear weapons are the way to get there, why wouldn’t Iran want to have them?

But if we step back and consider the logic behind this argument, it seems far from clear that a nuclear-armed Iran would ever dominate the Gulf – and indeed, that its influence might not be extended in the slightest.

The assumption that a nuclear Iran would have more regional influence is usually buttressed by two arguments. The first is that Iran could use nuclear blackmail to force other regional governments to follow its lead. But this is a deeply problematic assumption. The idea that Tehran would risk the political opprobrium and the real environmental damage to itself from launching a nuclear attack on a Gulf Arab state on something less than an issue of national survival does not ring true. Would the Iranians threaten to nuke Riyadh over a dispute within Opec on oil production quotas? Would anyone in Saudi Arabia believe them if they did? Nuclear threats from Tehran against its neighbours on anything but existential issues would just not be credible.

The history of the nuclear powers should make us cautious about assuming that nuclear arms are an efficient means of persuasion. A nuclear United States could not induce North Vietnam to stop fighting; a nuclear Soviet Union could not win its war in Afghanistan. Even in the Middle East itself, Israel has not been able to use its nuclear monopoly to impose its policy preferences on its neighbours. Nuclear weapons have not helped Israel in its efforts to control Lebanon or coerce Syria. Egypt and Syria attacked a nuclear Israel in 1973. Hizbollah attacked Israeli cities with missiles in 2006 and the Israelis did not respond with nuclear weapons. The idea that nuclear weapons automatically deliver regional influence has little historical precedent.

According to the logic of the Realist school of international relations, an increase in Iranian power should be answered by the formation of “balancing alliances” among regional rivals, limiting Iran’s influence. And we are, to some extent, already seeing this: Iran has influence with non-state actors and with an Iraqi government that hardly represents a coherent state.  Middle Eastern states seem to be quite worried about Iran and are trying to balance against it.  Moreover, those other regional states, fearful of Iran’s power, would very likely seek even closer relations with the U.S in case of an Iranian nuclear breakout. Iranian influence is greatest among non-state actors, not states.  It has considerable influence with them now, without nuclear weapons, for a variety of reasons (ideological kinship, Iranian financial aid, common enemies).  Would Hizbollah be closer to Tehran than it is now if Iran went nuclear?  I doubt it.

The second argument frequently advanced about the dangers of a nuclear Iran is that Tehran, emboldened by the bomb, would be more aggressive in stoking regional crises and would encourage its clients, like Hizbollah and Hamas, to be even more aggressive as well. But I can only ask: More aggressive than they have been?

A lack of nuclear arms has hardly prevented revolutionary Iran from pursuing an extremely aggressive regional policy. Non-nuclear Iran, under Khomeini, attempted to export the revolution throughout the Gulf and continued the Iran-Iraq War for six years after it had the satisfaction of throwing Iraqi forces out of Iran in the summer of 1982.  Non-nuclear Iran has supported Hizbollah for 25 years.  Non-nuclear Iran encouraged its confederates in Saudi Arabia to blow up the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, killing Americans and Saudis. And non-nuclear Iran has become arguably the dominant foreign influence in Iraq, despite the presence of 140,000 American troops.

How much more aggressive can nuclear-armed Iran be?

I am not trying to be facetious here. Iran has not always pursued maximalist policies, and on many issues of concern to the US and the Gulf Arabs, the Iranians have acted with restraint and sometimes, as during the Afghan War of 2001 and the subsequent negotiations on constructing a new Afghan government, even tacitly co-operated with the US. But having – or not having – nuclear weapons would not seem to be a major factor in determining whether Iran takes an aggressive posture within the region. Non-nuclear Iran has been aggressive during certain periods and more accommodationist during other periods, depending upon the regional balance of power and the state of play in Iranian domestic politics. It is a fair assumption that the same would hold true of a nuclear Iran. One could make an equally logical argument that a nuclear Iran might be even more cautious about regional meddling, given the possibility of nuclear escalation with Israel. Given how aggressive Iran has been at times in the recent past, it is highly unlikely that the thing holding back a more aggressive Iranian regional policy is the lack of nuclear weapons.

A nuclear Iran would not be a good thing, to be sure. It would introduce a new level of anxiety into regional politics and might prod Arab actors to consider acquiring their own nuclear deterrents. It could lead to a direct Israeli-Iranian confrontation. But American and Gulf Arab analysts need to stop exaggerating the effects of a nuclear-armed Iran on the regional balance of power. A strong case can be made that a nuclear Iran will not be able to dictate terms to its neighbours – nor would it necessarily be more aggressive in regional politics. Nuclear weapons do not automatically bestow regional hegemony upon their owners, and these exaggerations only bolster the position of nuclear hardliners in Tehran. A serious and detailed dialogue about the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons will only help the cause of those Iranians who are willing to accept reasonable limits on their nuclear programme in exchange for better relations with the US and the world.


F Gregory Gause is a professor of political science at the University of Vermont and the director of its Middle Eastern Studies programme.