Breaking the ice

Gary Sick

• Last Updated: July 24. 2008 5:48PM UAE / July 24. 2008 1:48PM GMT

Fanning the flames: student demonstrators in 1979 light up a flag atop the American Embassy in Tehran. Bettmann / Corbis

The United States and Iran have exchanged some positive signals in the last few weeks, in sharp contrast to the usual menu of barbs and outright hostility. Is this something we should take seriously? Does it challenge in any meaningful way the principles that have dominated the relationship between these two countries for the past thirty years?

The answer, I believe, is yes, but a qualified yes. There is indeed evidence that the ice is cracking, but it is still not warm enough to go swimming in these waters.

The United States was deeply wounded by Iran’s turn to radical clerical rule in 1979 and by the humiliation of American diplomats held hostage in Tehran for more than a year. Iran in turn remembered bitterly the 1953 coup that removed a popular leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, and instituted decades of monarchical rule under US influence. Despite widespread recognition that the two sides had many common interests in the region, politics poisoned all attempts to find common ground. This was compounded by revelations in 2002 that Iran had secretly begun to develop the capacity to enrich uranium, leading to heated speculation that the United States, Israel or both would launch a military strike.

Recently there have been signs that perhaps both sides were contemplating backing away from the abyss. Ironically, this may be because both Iran and the United States perceive that they are in a position of relative strength. Iran sees the United States with a lame-duck president, with forces stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with its economy under siege. The United States sees intense domestic political battles raging around Iran’s controversial president, its economy in crisis despite the high price of oil, and in need of foreign investment to provide jobs for its young population.

On the positive side, improved security in Iraq after the “surge” provides more manoeuvring room for the United States, and US success in building multilateral support for its position in the United Nations Security Council makes US threats of increased sanctions more credible than before. Iran, on the other hand, is conscious that its nuclear infrastructure gives it a new weight in regional politics that is matched by its increased political influence in Iraq and the Levant.

Each side expresses confidence in its own position, and neither wants to display the slightest weakness. The result is a sort of shadow play, with each side issuing veiled offers and threats. Progress has been excruciatingly slow. Each side publicly maintains that there has been no change in its position, leading observers to doubt whether anything of substance is in fact going on.

But the changes have been substantial. Two years ago, the United States openly opposed European negotiating efforts with Tehran. By contrast, in the latest round, the United States directly participated with its Security Council partners and Germany to craft the proposal that was presented to Iran. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the transmittal letter to the Iranian foreign minister and sent Undersecretary of State William Burns to participate in the Geneva meeting with a hand-picked representative of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The United States is now considering establishing an interests section in Tehran, a move that many regard as the first step toward re-establishment of diplomatic relations that were broken more than a quarter of a century ago.

Iran, in turn, has moderated its rhetoric about the “Great Satan.” Most noticeable has been the relative silence of Ahmadinejad. Last week he expressed support for the idea of a US interests section in Tehran and issued an unequivocal declaration that Iran was not threatening Israel. In a press conference in Malaysia he said “The Islamic Republic has never waged war against any nation and does not intend to do so. Israel is not an exception to this policy. Iran has no plans to attack Israel.” Political figures close to Ahmadinejad have gone out of their way recently to express their “love” for the American people.

All of these positive gestures have come amid Israeli displays of its long-range strike capabilities, followed immediately by ostentatious Iranian displays of multiple missile launches. Both countries claim they have the ability to strike the other. Both are probably exaggerating.

The reality is that neither Israel nor the United States is likely to launch an unprovoked military attack against Iran over the coming months. On the contrary, the policies of the Bush administration in its final six months appear to be headed in a very different direction.

Since 2006, when the Democratic Party won control of Congress, the administration of George W Bush has changed dramatically. The most dramatic shifts occurred at the Pentagon, where Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith – three major architects of the invasion of Iraq – were retired and replaced by much more pragmatic individuals. Robert Gates, the new defence secretary, was on record in favour of negotiating with Iran. Similar changes took place at other agencies, eventually including even Vice President Cheney’s staff.

At the same time, the United States began to pursue policies that directly contradicted its earlier positions. Negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program reversed the earlier US approach. Active high-level diplomacy on the Arab-Israeli issue replaced six years of neglect. And the United States decided to participate actively with the Europeans and members of the UN Security Council in developing a strategy of positive incentives to complement what had previously been an effort to persuade Iran to change its policies by use of coercive measures alone.

In each case, the Bush administration insisted that nothing at all had changed and that these efforts were merely extensions of its earlier policies. It is common in politics to claim consistency while changing directions. A former boss of mine once described it as an attempted “imperceptible 180 degree turn.” But in this case, the fiction of consistency was difficult to sustain.

The most persuasive evidence of this was the chorus of outraged commentary from US hardliners who objected to the new multilateral and diplomatic approach. Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon official who has consistently called for the overthrow of the Iranian government, described the new policies as “appeasement.” John Bolton, the former US Ambassador to the UN and one of the most outspoken proponents of the use of military force against Iran, went even further, telling Fox News, that “I think the State Department is doing its best to ensure a smooth transition toward the Obama administration.”

While that is a classic example of Bolton hyperbole, there is a grain of truth in it. The Bush administration, after difficult negotiations with the Iraqi government, has now reluctantly agreed to consider a “time horizon” for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, which is at least consistent with Senator Obama’s plan to withdraw forces in 16 months. More significantly, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki told Der Spiegel in an interview, referring to Obama’s proposed deadline, “That, we think, would be the right time frame for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes.”

On Iran, the Bush administration decision to participate in high level talks with Iran and to consider establishment of an interests section are both the kind of moves that might be expected as the first step toward a negotiated settlement with Iran. Senator Obama, of course, has said that he would be willing to negotiate with Iran without preconditions.

On both of these issues, recent US policy decisions make it more difficult for Senator McCain to accuse Obama of naïveté and inexperience since his prescriptions appear to be a continuation of the policy efforts of the Bush administration itself. In fact, it may be difficult for McCain, should he become president, to renounce this policy course and return to the earlier policy of pure sanctions and military threats.

There is of course no guarantee that these new policy gambits will produce useful results, but neither are they necessarily doomed to failure. Nearly thirty years ago, I was a participant in the efforts of another lame-duck American president, Jimmy Carter, as he attempted to negotiate an end to the hostage crisis with Iran. The prospect appeared hopeless until a few days before his presidency ended. At that point, Iran made some dramatic (and costly) concessions and it was over. That may not be a good model for our present condition, but it does contain some lessons worth remembering.

Gary Sick served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan, and is the author of two books on US-Iranian relations.