The balance of global power is changing – and central Asia is key

Adrian Pabst

• Last Updated: June 09. 2008 9:18PM UAE / June 9. 2008 5:18PM GMT

In itself, Iran’s recent application for membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is probably little more than diplomatic posturing. But coupled with the end of Lebanon’s political stalemate, Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria, and Egypt’s attempts to broker a truce in Gaza, it can be seen as part of a new dynamic that is changing the existing power balance and reshaping the geopolitics of the Middle East and beyond.

Each example reflects the failure of US policy in the region and the desire for local control of the political process, combined with the formation of regional power blocs. Taken together, they represent a wider change in the global political arena – a decline of Western power and the rise of a new nexus between central Asia and the wider Middle East that is likely to strengthen the influence of Russia and China.

Since September 11, the aim of US foreign policy has been to democratise both the greater Middle East and central Asia, beginning with Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The link between these two regions is, of course, Iran. But in addition to Iran’s strategic significance, the US would like to see a friendly government in Tehran on two other accounts: first, to gain access to Iran’s vast gas and oil reserves; second, to use Iranian territory as the shortest route for transporting hydrocarbons from central Asia and the Caspian Sea while bypassing Russia and China.

Perhaps as much as the nuclear issue, it is these two objectives that explain US efforts to isolate Iran internationally and to reinforce co-operation with energy-rich central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, where America is pushing for substantial oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline – the only major source of energy supply from East to West that escapes the Kremlin’s control.

Little wonder that the destination of the new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s first trip abroad was the Kazakh capital Astana, where Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to develop the Caspian gas pipeline and to enhance the capacity of the Central Asia-Centre pipeline, a Gazprom-controlled system which runs from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia.

Wary of Moscow’s (and Beijing’s) regional ambitions, Washington has also launched new diplomatic initiatives centred on creating a “Greater Central Asia”. In an attempt to prise Central Asian countries away from Russia and China, the US has promoted links with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, but so far only Afghanistan has obliged.

By contrast, the Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz leaderships have rebuffed American overtures and instead chosen to deepen and extend ties with their Russian and Chinese counterparts as part of the SCO, which has granted observer status to India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran.

Backed by Russia and Tajikistan, Iran wants to join the SCO for reasons of international legitimacy and a degree of protection against US and/or Israeli air strikes. There are many obstacles to Iranian membership in the SCO, not least Russia’s irritation with Iran’s increasingly confrontational stance over the nuclear issue and China’s opposition to transforming the SCO into a political-military alliance.

But Moscow, Beijing and Tehran have important common economic interests, above all Russian and Iranian energy exports in exchange for Chinese consumer and manufacturing goods. Together Russia and Iran control about 20 per cent of the world’s oil reserves and roughly half the world’s gas reserves. It is expected that Iranian-Chinese trade will grow from about US$14 billion (Dh 51.1bn) at the end of 2007 to more than US$20bn (Dh73bn) in 2009. One of Iran’s strategic goals is to export more gas to central and south Asia via the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline and in future to extend this link to China.

Beyond economic co-operation, Russia, China and Iran also have shared geopolitical interests. All three are united in their desire to thwart American ambitions. Moscow and Beijing are pushing for the withdrawal of US troops from central Asian countries and a more balanced US approach to Iran.

The Kremlin is also strengthening its strategic ties with Damascus and Tehran, in an attempt to rebalance the existing power equations. And support for Iran’s membership of the SCO provides a link between Russia’s traditional focus in central Asia and its recent forays into the wider Middle East – all of which is aimed at frustrating US efforts to dominate the area stretching from the Mediterranean via the Arabian Gulf to the ancient Silk Road.

With the loss of US credibility and leverage, the political vacuum is increasingly filled by regional powers and trans-regional organisations such as the SCO. Led by Russia and China, non-Western countries are defining the terms of political engagement and co-operation. This emerging nexus between central Asia and the wider Middle East looks set to change the global balance of power.



Adrian Pabst teaches religion and politics at the University of Nottingham in the UK and is a research fellow at the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies.