The next big mistake in Iraq: trying to shut out Moqtada al Sadr

Mohamad Bazzi

• Last Updated: May 07. 2008 10:28PM UAE / May 7. 2008 6:28PM GMT

In hindsight, it is easy to see the mistakes that the United States made in Iraq: the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the whole-scale purge of Ba’ath Party members that crippled any effort to build a new government. It is harder to see mistakes about to be made. But there’s one major error unfolding right now, and it’s not too late to prevent it: the exclusion of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr from the political process.

The consequences of trying to isolate Sadr and his political movement are profound: he will lash out further at the Iraqi government and US troops, his supporters will completely abandon the ceasefire he imposed last August, and violence will spiral out of control once again. US commanders credit Sadr’s ceasefire with a significant drop in both attacks on US forces and sectarian bloodletting. Those highly touted gains made during the “surge” of US troops will evaporate.

The Iraqi government recently approved a draft law barring any political party with a militia from participating in provincial elections set for October. While Sadr and his Mahdi Army were not specifically mentioned in the legislation, they are the intended target. Other Iraqi parties operate militias, but they have been largely absorbed into the Iraqi army or security forces. The bill is now before the Iraqi parliament.

Past attempts to force Sadr out of the political sphere have backfired. In March 2004, the then-US administrator Paul Bremer closed Sadr’s newspaper in Baghdad, leading to weeks of protests by Sadrists and an uprising by the Mahdi army in southern Iraq. Sadr emerged from that battle stronger than ever.

A year later, the US and its Iraqi allies made another crucial mistake: allowing Sunnis to be excluded from the political process. Most Sunni parties boycotted the parliamentary elections of January 2005. The resulting Sunni marginalisation helped the insurgency gain a firmer foothold in Sunni areas and set the stage for sectarian warfare.

Today, the Iraqi government is on the verge of disenfranchising the Shiite nationalists represented by Sadr, with equally disastrous consequences.

In singling out the Sadrists, the prime minister, Nouri al Maliki, is not trying to restore order. He wants to eliminate a political rival. In the process, he risks escalating an intra-Shiite civil war in oil-rich southern Iraq. The recent fighting in Basra was the latest chapter of a conflict between Sadr and his main rival for dominance of the Shiite heartland, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, led by a US and Iranian-backed cleric, Abdulaziz al-Hakim. Maliki and his Dawa Party are allied with Hakim, and they are using the Iraqi government to battle Sadr. Whatever faction ultimately rules Basra will control much of Iraq’s oil and the means of shipping it.

By launching the offensive in Basra, Maliki’s main goal was to weaken the Sadrists before the provincial elections because he is worried that his bloc will lose to them. But Sadr’s militia performed well and gained new ground in Basra. Unable to defeat the Sadrists militarily, Maliki and his allies are now trying to rig the system and keep Sadr out of politics.

It’s virtually impossible to wipe out the Sadrist trend, which is a social, political and military movement that enjoys wide support, particularly among young and poor Shiites. Since he first emerged as the leading Shiite critic of the US occupation, Sadr has been adept at using religious symbols to position himself as heir to a long line of Shiite martyrs. In the process, he has tapped into a central tenet of Shiism: dying in defence of one’s beliefs, as the sect’s founding figures did in the 7th century.

If Maliki is serious, he should dissolve all militias including those linked to the government, especially the Supreme Council’s Badr militia. If the Iraqi government were to target all the militias equally, then the Sadrists would be forced to disband the Mahdi Army or risk a public backlash. Right now, though, most Iraqi Shiites can see that Sadr is being singled out.

The local elections are important because they will determine the make up of provincial councils, and the winning faction will be able to appoint local governors. The Supreme Council is hoping to win the vote so that it can form an autonomous region in the Shiite south similar to the Kurds in the north. Sadr is opposed to this federal system; he argues that carving up Iraq into self-governing regions would lead to the country’s break up.

This is not a purely Iraqi problem. If there is any hope of keeping violence down, US forces need Sadr’s militia to adhere to its ceasefire. Maliki’s adventure in Basra forced US commanders to commit resources for a battle meant to settle political scores between Shiite factions. If the US gets further mired in this struggle, the main winner will be Iran, which supports all the Shiite factions.

Unlike Maliki and Hakim, Sadr is a home-grown leader with genuine support inside Iraq. Since the US invasion, Sadr has emphasised his two main claims to leadership: as the son of a revered ayatollah martyred by the Ba’ath regime, and as someone who never left Iraq to live in comfortable exile. He also has tried to win support by creating a social service network in Shiite cities and by modelling himself after his father’s vision of an activist clergyman.

There is still time for Washington to convince Maliki to change the draft election law, and to open a dialogue with Sadr. The US should know by now that it cannot simply wish Sadr away or marginalise him. Iraqi leaders must learn that same lesson.

Mohamad Bazzi is the Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He covered Iraq as Newsday’s Middle East bureau chief for four years