Syria has easy answers, but ducks the hard questions

Emile Hokayem, Political Editor

• Last Updated: November 18. 2009 12:46AM UAE / November 17. 2009 8:46PM GMT

A beaming Bashar al Assad visited the Elysee Palace in Paris last week to crown a series of foreign policy coups that are returning a once-shunned Syria to the international fold.

The French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who hopes to carve himself a role as a major regional player by facilitating Syria’s reintegration, is not the only one to have been bamboozled by the Syrian president (although so far Mr Sarkozy has done better at breaking taboos than obtaining tangible concessions from his new partner).

Mr Assad’s allies in Lebanon managed to strong-arm the prime minister-elect, Saad Hariri, into giving them the government share and portfolios they demanded, despite losing the election in June. Of course, they could not have done so without using weapons transported through Syria to intimidate and paralyse political activity.

The national unity government has been hailed as a positive outcome that will stabilise Lebanon, but the truth is that it carries the birthmark of impotence; and worse, the deal rewards those who have used guns over those who won the vote. To Syria’s advantage and Lebanon’s detriment, it defers any discussion of Hizbollah’s armed status.

Other pay-offs are materialising for Damascus. Several countries thanked Syria for its role in the formation of a government in Beirut, choosing to view it as largesse rather than an obligation under international law. Mr Hariri, whose father’s assassination in 2005 precipitated Syria’s humiliating retreat from Lebanon and heralded a tense period marred by political violence against anti-Syrian figures, will visit Damascus soon in what will doubtless be interpreted as a show of submission.

As Syria rebuilds ties with Saudi Arabia, France embraces Mr Assad, the international consensus on protecting Lebanon’s sovereignty crumbles (the Syrian ambassador in Washington last week rejected any need to demarcate the border, despite several UN resolutions) and the fear-driven implosion of his parliamentary majority, Mr Hariri has no weapons left with which to fend off Syrian pressure.

Further south, Mr Assad’s ally Hamas is rejoicing at the miseries of Mahmoud Abbas. Damascus actively discouraged Palestinian reconciliation under Egyptian auspices, a bet that paid off when the US fatally undermined the hapless Palestinian president. And because Hamas is not yet an acceptable interlocutor, the road to peace suddenly seems to go through Damascus rather than Ramallah.

Even the Israeli leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, has alluded to that possibility, though he has tactical motivations. With the terms having changed from land-for-peace to realignment-for-peace (meaning an unlikely Syrian break with Iran, Hamas and Hizbollah) and an Israeli public opposing the return of the Golan Heights to Syria, a breakthrough is unlikely in the short term; but Mr Netanyahu, just like Mr Assad, needs the process to show a gentler face.

For these reasons, a “Syria first” option would be at best a distraction, at worse a setback for the overall peace venture. Syria has always tried to dictate the parameters of the peace process, not only for itself but also for the Lebanese and the Palestinians, as a way to increase its regional influence. The opportunity for Lebanon to think about an independent peace track with Israel has passed, but the Palestinians can hardly be told to wait, nor would the US accept such delay.

Syria is finding relief elsewhere: it has reached a detente with Saudi Arabia after years of damning accusations of destabilisation attempts. The reconciliation between Riyadh and Damascus squares badly with the Saudi goal to weaken Iran’s hand in the Levant and gives Arab assent to renewed Syrian dominance over Lebanon, but it is driven by the necessity to weaken a common enemy, the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al Maliki, before elections in January.

If all this proves anything, it is that as Syria’s comfort level rises, it tends to become less amenable; witness its procrastination on a partnership agreement with the European Union. Negotiations stalled in 2004 over Syria’s objection to clauses on human rights and weapons of mass destruction, a delay explained later by the revelation of a Syrian covert nuclear programme that the International Atomic Energy Agency is now investigating. The EU has renewed its offer, but a triumphant Syria will have none of it for the moment.

To the dismay of Damascus, however, the one country that remains cool to its charm offensive is the United States. American engagement has proceeded with far more caution than European diplomacy. Barack Obama is certainly committed to exploring ways to re-engage Syria; already there is security cooperation on Iraq, and the decision to send an ambassador to Damascus. But he has so far refused to give Syria a clean bill of health, even renewing sanctions that Damascus expected to be lifted.

The reason is simple. Washington sees little progress on issues that matter most for US interests, and it worries about European and Arab over-eagerness. Indeed, the real success for Mr Assad is that western and Arab overtures have come at no price. The alliance with Iran shows no sign of loosening, weapons continue to flow into Lebanon in contravention of UN resolutions, the tough rejectionist language contradicts Syria’s claims to be seeking peace (Mr Assad still describes muqawama, resistance, as Syria’s strategic choice) and the progress on border security with Iraq remains timid; Syria’s contribution to Iraqi security might have more validity if it intercepted foreign insurgents at Damascus airport, rather than allow them to cross the border at will.

Mr Assad has undeniably shown political acumen by betting that time, fatigue and shifting Palestinian and Lebanese politics would erode international will, and he could manoeuvre his way out of isolation at little cost. He has avoided the hard choices about Syria’s orientation and behaviour, but they have not vanished. And time will not always be on Syria’s side.

ehokayem@thenational.ae