Jihadist challenge to al Qa'eda

Paul Woodward, Online Correspondent

• Last Updated: November 16. 2009 9:03AM UAE / November 16. 2009 5:03AM GMT

In recent years, as the victims of violent jihadist attacks have predominantly been Muslims, the jihadist ideology as propounded and put into effect by al Qa'eda's leadership has been rejected by some of its original proponents.

"In May 2007, Sayyid Imam al Sharif, better known as Dr Fadl, a former member of the al Qa'eda leadership, attacked its tactics of mass slaughter, arguing that this inevitably led to the deaths of innocents, and was therefore un-Islamic," wrote Michael Smith in The National.

"He was particularly critical of the way in which Muslims lived freely within western societies, then attacked the very people who had given them shelter. Fadl's attack was dismissed by his fellow Egyptian, and former fellow student, al Zawahiri, as having been written while Fadl was in prison in Egypt.

"But last week saw a fresh attack, this time not from just one man, but from a complete militant movement previously aligned to al Qa'eda. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), issued a new religious document denouncing the tactics used by al Qa'eda as illegal under Islamic law."

The text featured in a new documentary, "The Jihadi Code", which aired on CNN on Sunday.

"The new code, a 417-page religious document entitled Corrective Studies is the result of more than two years of intense and secret talks between the leaders of the LIFG and Libyan security officials...

"The code has been circulated among some of the most respected religious scholars in the Middle East and has been given widespread backing. It is being debated by politicians in the US and studied by western intelligence agencies."

The document, authored chiefly by Emir Abdullah al Sadeq, the LIFG's leader, and Abu Munder al Saidi, the group's spiritual leader, explicity rejects the use of indiscriminate violence.

It says: "There are ethics and morals to jihad, among which are: that the jihad is for the sake of Allah, and the proscription of killing women, children, the elderly, monks, wage earners (employees), messengers (ambassadors), merchants and the like. Also among the ethics and morals of jihad is the proscription of treachery, the obligation to keep promises, the obligation of kindness to prisoners of war, the proscription of the mutilation of the dead and the proscription of hiding spoils from the leader. Adherence to these ethics is what distinguishes the jihad of Muslims from the wars of other nations that do not give any weight to ethics."

Noman Benotman, a former LIFG leader who has coordinated peace talks between the LIFG's imprisoned leaders in Triopli and Saif al Islam al Qadafi, the son of Libyan leader Muammer Qadafi, says: "The most important strategic impact for the ... book is not that it has pragmatically denounced violence, but that it has ideologically de-legitimised violence."

Frank J Cilluffo and F Jordan Evert from George Washington University interviewed Mr Benotman last month and noted: "In many ways, his ideological background is similar to that of al Qa'eda's senior leadership. He too fought in Afghanistan and even advised Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri on strategy.

"In the summer of 2000, Benotman traveled as the LIFG representative to a gathering of jihadists from across the Arab world convened by bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan. It was at this time that Benotman began to break with al Qa'eda's leaders over differences in opinion about strategy.

"At first the break was private. Benotman warned bin Laden that a jihad against the United States would backfire. In November 2007 however, the break became public. In an open letter to al Zawahiri, Benotman argued that al Qa'eda's tactics violated Islam's call for the protection of 'man's religion, life, mind, off-spring, and wealth.' He called on the organisation to declare a unilateral cessation of military operations."

In the interview, the former LIFG leader described the genesis of the peace talks in Libya.

"I have to say the idea and the initiative was launched by Saif al Islam al Qadafi, Colonel Muammer al Qadafi's son, in December 2007. Because I was in the heart of that process since its launch, I can say without a doubt that Saif al Islam himself was the main driver and the power house for its sure success. And the LIFG, when they knew that Saif al Islam was sponsoring the initiative, they showed no hesitation to accept the window of opportunity to engage in the process of peace talks...

"There are many lessons one can take from this process, but the most important one is sometimes we face problems which appear to be unsolvable because our minds have been set by default. And when we start to think of the unthinkable we find that those unsolvable problems are actually solvable, and the main problem was our way of thinking, not the problem itself."

In the London Review of Books, Hugh Niles noted: "The détente has been hailed as a victory over extremism and the latest indicator of Libya's reformist trajectory. It is undoubtedly a major coup for one of the Libyan leader's sons, Saif al Islam al Qadafi, who helped broker the deal, visiting the LIFG's leaders in prison and facing down the regime's old guard who were reluctant to pardon them. Terrorism in the name of Islam has always posed more of a threat to Arab countries than to the West. Since coming to power in 1969 Qadafi has, till now, shown a zero-tolerance policy towards his Islamist opponents. (It's notable that in the period since 9/11 there have been no killings or kidnappings of foreigners in Libya - unlike its neighbours.)

"Although it's highly unusual for an armed Islamic insurgency to end peacefully - a precedent is Gamma Islamiya, which called a ceasefire from within Egyptian prisons in 2003 - it's unlikely that this will put an end to terrorism in Libya for good. Most attacks nowadays are committed not by large organised groups but by nihilistic self-starters."

pwoodward@thenational.ae