For the Arabs, these were America’s 15 wasted years

Emile Hokayem

• Last Updated: November 08. 2009 10:32PM UAE / November 8. 2009 6:32PM GMT

Ask any Arab where he was on April 9, 2003, when US marines pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in Baghdad, broadcast live on TV and watched by millions, and he will tell you. But most have a hard time remembering what they were doing on that cold day in November 1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed under the pressure of people power.

For the Arab world, Europe was as distant as its internal struggles were irrelevant, while Iraq sits at its geographic and political heart. But in Middle Eastern geopolitical terms, 1989 compares easily to 2003. The Fall of the Wall fundamentally upset the regional balance of power and created dynamics that shaped its politics for 15 years.

Arabs are certainly ambivalent about it. For those who romanticised the Soviet Union and welcomed it as a counterweight to American power, the void is being imperfectly filled by Iran and the new rejectionist front. For the disillusioned who recovered from an infatuation that brought no sustainable or tangible progress to their societies, the quest for the right model of development continues, with China growingly in mind. For those who dreaded a Soviet victory, there is a sense of vindication diluted by the disappointment of the Pax Americana. 

The love story between much of the Arab world and the Soviet Union began strongly, but could not survive its structural limitations. To be sure, there was clearly a convergence of interests and values in the aftermath of the Second World War. Gripped by an intense anti-western, anti-Israeli, anti-capitalist, godless fever, key Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq looked for a foreign patron.

Happy to find allies and proxies in its strategic and ideological struggle against the US, the Soviet Union played that part, posing as a model of economic development and state modernisation. In turn, Arab nationalism, whether in its Nasserite or Baathist form, embraced many communist tenets, made use of Soviet expertise and technology, mimicked Soviet despotism and joined the Soviet bloc bandwagon on strategic matters. Seeing Soviet expansionism as inimical to their identity and interests, the young Gulf states were alone in rejecting such an alignment, instead supporting the US in its containment strategy and helping anti-communist elements from Yemen to Afghanistan, a strategy that would come back to bite them later. 

The key question is whether the alliance with the Soviet Union has been of any benefit to Arab interests, whether national or transnational – and the answer is a resounding “no”. In truth, Arab leaders allied with the Soviet bloc realised the limits of the alliance long before the Wall collapsed. No amount of Soviet weaponry, military doctrine and strategic support could help them to overwhelm the US-backed Israel. Soviet economic assistance failed to modernise and diversify their economies, which clearly lagged behind those who embraced free-market economics. Soviet-trained engineers and technicians were no match for western talent. Their internal stability was shaken by infighting and coups, and came only at the cost of extreme authoritarianism. And more so than the US, the Soviet Union revelled in manipulating the deep fissures in Arab politics.  

Egypt was the first nation to come to its senses: Anwar Sadat renounced the alliance in favour of a rapprochement with the US that delivered peace with Israel and considerable military and economic assistance. And as the Soviet Union descended into a social and economic morass at home and a strategic quagmire in Afghanistan, it lost allure and credibility. 

The decay of the Soviet Union is perhaps best measured by what would not have happened had the Wall stood firm and Soviet power had endured: Moscow would hardly have accepted the US liberation of Kuwait in 1990 and its subsequent primacy in the Gulf, or been satisfied with an impotent role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. 

The new world order born from 1989 was certainly unipolar, but the US seemed unsure what to do with its newfound power. Torn between democratic ideals and the demands of realpolitik, America invested (ultimately wasted) capital in trying to broker peace between Israel and the Arabs and none in encouraging political and economic reforms in the Arab world, oblivious to the rise and implications of political Islam, including its violent strain. In doing so, the US missed an opportunity to play a benign and positive role.

There is still no stable collective security system to prevent inter-state war or prevent state failure, and America’s balancing role has been undermined by its recklessness and incompetence in dealing with Iraq. So it would be fair to conclude that the era that began in 1989 may well have ended in 2003, when US power peaked and then quickly began to erode. 

Today many Arabs lament the absence of a counterbalance to the US and dream that a rising China or even a resurgent Russia will eventually fill the role, but this view is not held at the official level. There is a sober realisation that the US, despite its political toxicity and strategic failures, will remain a partner impossible to bypass and a credible ally of last resort. That does not prevent the Gulf states, including the UAE, from diversifying and deepening other relationships, but they seek partners who can complement rather than displace US power. 

The Gulf states find it easier and more beneficial to operate in a world where power has become more diffuse and economic interests dominate, so it is unsurprising to see business between the Gulf and former communist nations boom. This is perhaps the most positive American contribution to the Middle East. By promoting globalisation and economic liberalism, which even its former communist rivals China and Russia have adopted, it has encouraged the economic interdependence that often leads to strategic rapprochement. The Soviet Union simply could not have done that. 

ehokayem@thenational.ae