Now is not the time to let a nuclear Iran off the hook

Emile Hokayem

• Last Updated: October 28. 2009 9:27AM UAE / October 28. 2009 5:27AM GMT

Iran is expected to respond in the coming days to a deal brokered in Vienna by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that, if approved, would provide some respite in the continuing nuclear dispute. But beyond providing an understandable sigh of relief, does the deal assist the wider effort to persuade Iran to demonstrate nuclear transparency and good behaviour? In other words, who benefits more from the time gained – Iran or the international community?

The short-term benefits of the draft deal are undeniable: Iran would send a significant amount of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia to be turned into fuel rods that would power a research reactor in Tehran, preventing it from being turned into weapons-grade material. The deal could postpone a still hypothetical Iranian decision to produce highly-enriched uranium (the main component of a nuclear device) by up to a year as Iran rebuilds its LEU stockpile, creating more time for a diplomatic solution. But the deal could also defuse an international sense of urgency while Iran maliciously persists in its nuclear pursuit.  

When word of a possible deal was first floated in discussions in Geneva that also featured a bilateral meeting between the US and Iranian delegates, it was hailed as a sign of Iranian flexibility by some and a deceptive delaying tactic by others. But analysts and government officials are still hard pressed to explain why Iranian negotiators came to the Swiss city ready for a deal and then wavered.

Did Tehran feel compelled by internal dynamics or was it pressured by the international outcry after the exposure of an undeclared enrichment facility in Qom? Were the embattled Iranian authorities trying to score points with the international community and undercut by internal discontent? Were technical considerations important as Iranian LEU is thought to contain impurities that would wreck centrifuges in an attempt to produce HEU?

So far the signs from Tehran have been confusing, a reflection of political differences or simply their attempt to stall. Their negotiators resorted to tired tactics during the talks, snubbing the French delegates who have adopted the toughest line against them. Then they floated another idea that would negate the Geneva understanding: Iran would simply buy fuel for its research reactor, preserving its LEU stockpile.

Senior figures in the regime, such as the parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, have complained that the West is tricking them into a deal detrimental to Iranian rights but are backing away from an understanding that had the approval of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. There are clearly divisions within Iran’s ruling elite.

The limited nature of the proposed deal is certainly cause for concern. It addresses only the question of Iran’s existing LEU stockpile, not the more fundamental issue of its continuing enrichment activities, which the Qom facility would buttress (it is now under IAEA observation so its production can be monitored). But US officials would argue that they need this extra time to develop a comprehensive Iran strategy and persuade other countries on to get on board; small steps such as these contribute to a better negotiating climate.

It is entirely possible that Iran will reject the deal, or propose unacceptable amendments; for example by sending abroad too little LEU to negate its ability to manufacture weapons-grade material. But that would be yet another blow to its credibility. More importantly, Iran would alienate Russia and China, which have been pushing for a compromise as a way to defuse western insistence on their support for sanctions. The Iranian regime, dreading further pressure from without when it is already under pressure from within, is certainly aware of this. Under these conditions, Iran is likely to provide a less than satisfactory but not entirely unacceptable answer.

The Vienna agreement, if there is one, may be more than just tactical. Iran will have put its much-cherished right to enrich in the hands of others, creating a precedent on which the international community could build. More important, by letting Iran enrich material illicitly obtained, the international community, including the US, would tacitly recognise Iran’s right to enrich instead of enforcing the strict zero-enrichment position enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions.

Contrary to what Iran argues, the right to enrich is not and should not be absolute. Everyone has a right to drive, for example, but it is conditional on physical and mental considerations, on obtaining a licence and on respecting traffic laws and road safety. If the licence is withdrawn, a new course that tests fitness and ability is required. Iran has been cheating and concealing, and should be held accountable.  

There remains the long-term question of whether the international community will back down from its insistence on preventing Iran from mastering the entire fuel cycle, and accept the reality that it already has. In that event, there are technical options available: the international community could impose stringent monitoring and safeguard measures; it could ship out all the enriched nuclear material; it could create a multilateral fuel bank that would provide Iran with fuel while Iran enriches only for research purposes; or a combination of the above.

But the past opacity of Iran’s activities, including the possibility that it has planned a covert nuclear programme, and the need to protect the integrity of the non-proliferation regime (an issue France is advocating much more forcefully than the US, perhaps as part of a good cop-bad cop strategy) are reason enough to demand full transparency and co-operation from Iran. No one should offer Iran a half-baked way out.  

ehokayem@thenational.ae