The Taliban’s last throw of the dice … and it failed

Shaukat Qadir

• Last Updated: October 19. 2009 9:44PM UAE / October 19. 2009 5:44PM GMT

Leading up to Pakistan’s new military offensive in South Waziristan, the country endured the worst period of terrorist activity in its history.

It began with a suicide attack on the UN World Food Programme complex in Islamabad on October 5, and continued with six attacks on October 15; three on security installations in Lahore, one at a police post in Kohat, a car bomb in Peshawar, and the targeted killing of two security personnel in Quetta, followed by another suicide attack in Peshawar the following day. In those 12 days, around 180 people died and twice as many were injured.

Most foreign analysts and much of the international media has interpreted these attacks as a resurgence of the Taliban under Hakimullah Mehsud, and an attempt to regain the initiative; particularly since the terrorists have resumed targeting security installations, including the supposedly best-protected military GHQ.

There is little doubt that these well co-ordinated and ingeniously planned attacks have shaken the confidence of many. Terrorists have succeeded in making the point that no place is as safe as it might seem. The attack on the WFP seems the most inexplicable, since it targeted the most people-friendly programme of the UN. However, since the main UN building and all its other programmes are in the inaccessible diplomatic enclave, this was perhaps the only one of the UN offices that they could target.

The methodically planned attack on GHQ has also proven wrong those analysts, including myself, who argued that Baitullah Mehsud’s death would result in a denial of planning assistance to Hakimullah. It appears that whatever vacuum may have been created by the departure of the al Qa’eda advisers who helped to plan previous attacks has been more than made up by the likes of Qari Raees and Mohammed Aqeel, alias Dr Usman.

However, Aqeel decided to expose himself to danger and take personal charge of the attack on GHQ. He was prepared to lose his life in the process, since he was also equipped with a suicide vest and tried to blow himself up when he was about to be captured; he failed, and was taken alive. But this is not what these planners do. They usually make the plans and send others out to execute them, who die in the process. Planners do not usually expose themselves to danger. Does that smack of some desperation on their part, since the all-out offensive in South Waziristan was clearly imminent?

Before answering that question, a few words on the response by security forces. In all fairness one must begin by admitting that in these circumstances, the initiative lies with the terrorists. Even when an intelligence warning has been issued a couple of months before, as was the case in the attack on GHQ, the passage of time results in a certain amount of complacency. What is more, with initiative and the element of surprise on their side, it is virtually impossible to prevent a certain degree of penetration by the terrorists.

That being said, in each instance of a physical attack by terrorists (although not, of course, suicide bombers) the response has been remarkably swift and increasingly effective. Security forces arrived within minutes of the attacks. In each case, no one escaped and even the leaders were captured or killed.

Even the notoriously inefficient Pakistani police force now responds far more swiftly and daringly. Conversing with the solders and young officers, I find their dogged determination impressive. Even more impressive is that they are not vengeful. They “have seen the enemy within” and are conscious of the threat he poses; they are obviously benefiting from on the job training.

I know of a young police officer in Lahore who is on a desk assignment, yet he went to the Federal Investigations Agency (FIA) building in Lahore to assist in the operation as soon as he learnt of the attack. As soon as it was over he left for Munawan, and when that concluded he moved on to the last place still under attack; a remarkably courageous young lad.

Senior officers in the security forces have concluded that the post-GHQ attacks were carried out in haste, and were therefore less penetrative and costly than they might have been. It would seem that the possibility of Aqeel being taken alive was not catered for, and if he had not actually planned the other attacks as well, he knew sufficient details of them. Consequently all the later attacks, which may originally have been planned to span a week or so, had to be executed in haste in the fear that he might “sing” any day.

Those who know the principal actors in the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), even if only by reputation, were aware that Hakimullah is a loose cannon. He is bold, audacious and has a craving for publicity. He is rather young for the leadership role, in his late twenties, and it is reputed that when he was married recently he was of the view that the event would be carried by all the Pakistani media.

While the TTP has succeeded in increasing the feeling of insecurity in the people of Pakistan, it has also solidified their determination and resolve. If the object of these attacks was to break the will of the people, it has succeeded in achieving the precise opposite. If it was to “retake the initiative” and preempt the Waziristan operation, it has obviously failed, since the ground offensive began on the night of October 17.

Consequently, to answer the question posed earlier; yes, these were acts of desperation – one final attempt to break the resolve of the people, which has failed. The Pakistani army is proceeding to clear Waziristan, fully supported by the vast majority of its fellow citizens.

Brig Gen Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer